Strategic Panorama Published by the National Institute for Strategic Studies the Strategic Panorama is an academic specialized publication in political sciences The National Institute for Strategic Studies en-US Strategic Panorama 2616-9460 THE DANGERS OF AN UNDEFEATED RUSSIA <p><strong>This article</strong> highlights the importance of accuracy in understanding the expectations, judgments and apprehensions of all parties involved in an armed conflict. The author reviews misconceptions that Russia, Ukraine and the West had about each other prior to 24&nbsp;February and singles out three axioms that arguably need to be kept in the foreground while analyzing the stakes and perils of this war. Five arguments, ranging from issues of geopolitics to matters of economy and security, are then put forward to prove why a failure to defeat Russia will cost Ukraine and the West more than the West’s determination to do what is necessary to enable Ukraine to prevail. The author concludes that if the West’s hesitancy is not replaced by a sense of urgency, the United States and its European allies will face a&nbsp;choice of a different nature: direct intervention with Russia or the loss of Ukraine.</p> James Sherr Copyright (c) 2022-11-15 2022-11-15 5 11 10.53679/2616-9460.specialissue.2022.01 THE WAR AS A RESULT OF THE FRAGILE PEACE: THE CONCEPTUAL LOGIC OF WAR <p><strong>In times</strong> of war, the theoretical problems of the essence of war and peace acquire a practical dimension. The experience of the Russian-Ukrainian war, which became a key factor in changes in the international security system, requires understanding. The full-scale and unprovoked invasion of the Russian Federation into Ukraine, as well as the further development of the conflict, dramatically changed the international community's perception of the stability of peace in Europe. The war prompted a revision of the assumptions about the nature of modern conflicts. Assumptions about a reduction in the weight of traditional means of warfare turned out to be premature. At the same time, non-kinetic military tools, in particular cognitive ones, retain their weight.</p> <p>This article aims at defining the semantic logic of war and peace as relative concepts considered in a single conceptual space. The basic concept in this relationship is war, and peace is its conventional consequence. An analysis of the discursive implementation of both concepts allows us to project them onto political processes and determine the status of war and peace as reality. Particular attention is paid to the power of discourse.</p> <p>In conclusion, the authors propose a Ukrainian Peace Strategy project, with 12 points representing the Ukrainian vision of the goals necessary to end the war.</p> Borys Parakhonskyi Halyna Yavorska Copyright (c) 2022-11-15 2022-11-15 12 24 10.53679/2616-9460.specialissue.2022.02 EPISTEMOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF THE RUSSIA-UKRAINE MODERN WAR <p><strong>Ideas</strong> on the political nature, causes, motivations of the parties and the very essence of the Russia-Ukraine hybrid war of 2014–2022 are presented. Ideological preconditions, reasons and current consequences of the Russian armed aggression against Ukraine, as well as the evolution of the formation of the political and security doctrines of the ruling regime of Russia from quasi-liberal views to the expansionist concept of “restoration of historical Russia” and justification of aggressive war against Ukraine are considered.</p> <p>The authors’ theoretical framework for examining the political nature, essence and causes as well as specificities of this war is based on the provisions of classic military theory as well as their further development. These fundamental ideas are gaining new relevance in the context of hybrid war with the simultaneous presence of elements of military confrontation pertinent to third-generation war and factors pertinent to the new type of sixth-generation war. Conclusions are based on an analysis of a number of conceptual documents by Russia’s leadership over the past 15&nbsp;years.</p> Ihor Lossovskyi Iryna Prykhodko Copyright (c) 2022-11-15 2022-11-15 25 34 10.53679/2616-9460.specialissue.2022.03 NATO ENLARGEMENT AS A FALSE EXCUSE FOR RUSSIA’S WAR AGAINST UKRAINE <p><strong>The paper</strong> examines the discussion of the origins of Russia’s present-day aggression and militarism, between those accusing NATO of unjustified intrusion into the Russian “sphere of influence”, and those deeming that Putin’s bellicose Anti-Western sentiment is a product of his need to consolidate and legitimize his power within Russia. The authors prove that domestic factors were significantly more important. The development of Ukraine’s partnership with NATO and the prospects of the Alliance’s further enlargement were only a false excuse for Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. V.&nbsp;Putin’s genuine fear is not NATO but the rise of successful democratic western-oriented countries along Russia’s borders, especially Ukraine. It is unjustified to blame the Alliance while Putin wants to destroy Ukraine as an independent state and is ready to indiscriminately kill Ukrainian civilians. However, NATO took the disadvantageous approach of pursuing a policy of pretending that Ukraine and Georgia were on their way to Alliance membership, while, in reality, the question of their integration has been kept in limbo since the 2008 Bucharest summit. Russia probably interpreted it as a window of opportunity to change the situation to its own benefit while these countries had no “insurance policy” from NATO.</p> Tetiana Sydoruk Viktor Pavliuk Copyright (c) 2022-11-15 2022-11-15 35 44 10.53679/2616-9460.specialissue.2022.04 STRATEGIC ANALYSIS OF UKRAINE’S SECURITY ENVIRONMENT <p><strong>The article</strong> reports on the results of a strategic analysis of Ukraine's security environment based on a SWOT analysis. The focus is on the security environment as of the eve of the large-scale war launched by the Russian Federation against Ukraine in February 2022 as well as the changes it has undergone since then. The author prognosticates trends in the development of Ukraine's security environment in the post-war period based on the identified sources of the main threats to the national security of Ukraine, as well as vulnerabilities, advantages and opportunities for the development of the state and society in the new conditions. It is also predicted that sources of the main threats to the national security of Ukraine in the post-war period will undergo transformation.</p> <p>The author argues that a timely identification of existing and projected threats to national security, vulnerabilities, strengths of the state and society, and their opportunities to further protect national interests in the conditions of a certain security situation, when coupled with an account of trends in the development of the security environment, provide a foundation for determining the strategic goals and priorities of state policy in the area of national security.</p> <p>The research results give grounds to conclude that the main strategic goal for Ukraine in the area of national security is the development of sufficient domestic capabilities as a basis for ensuring its own security and resilience. The important vectors of state policy for ensuring the national security of Ukraine in the post-war period will include strengthening its defense capability, increasing the level of readiness to crises response, obtaining external security guarantees outside NATO, developing bilateral relations with strategic partners, restoring the economic and human development of Ukraine, and improving the efficiency of public administration.</p> Olga Reznikova Copyright (c) 2022-11-15 2022-11-15 45 53 10.53679/2616-9460.specialissue.2022.05 RUSSIA’S ENERGY POLICY AS A TOOL OF HYBRID DESTRUCTION OF THE DEMOCRATIC WORLD <p><strong>Authoritarian</strong> players, who take advantage of the fundamental principles of liberal democracy in their own interests, can use energy as an effective tool for destroying democratic and market-oriented societies. Russia has perfected its means of influence and a toolkit for the practical implementation of its interests on the EU energy market, utilizing energy to the fullest extent to achieve its foreign policy goals. Involving the establishments of EU countries in energy cooperation projects with the Russian Federation turned out to be the most efficient method. The willingness to lobby for Russia's interests has been stimulated, in particular, by ensuring special terms of supply contracts, access for companies from certain countries to the extraction of energy resources in Russia, and the employment of officials from certain countries in Russian energy companies.</p> <p>The exploitation of energy as a weapon effectively neutralizes the ability of liberal democracies to oppose the aggressive behavior of authoritarian energy suppliers. Moreover, individual countries become informal allies of authoritarian leaders under certain conditions.</p> <p>The author argues that certain indicators can be used to formalize the assessment of the level of influence of energy resource suppliers on the ability of the leaders of consumer countries to resist pressure. This formalization makes it possible to reasonably approach the assessment of the level of the country's energy security and overall national security based on the influence of external threats, especially dependence on an external supplier.</p> Oleksandr Sukhodolia Copyright (c) 2022-11-15 2022-11-15 54 71 10.53679/2616-9460.specialissue.2022.06 CULTURAL GENOCIDE AS INTERNATIONAL CRIME COMMITTED BY THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION IN UKRAINE <p><strong>This article</strong> analyzes acts of destruction of culture and identity of the Ukrainian people by the Russian Federation following the concept of cultural genocide by Raphael Lemkin. The author singles out stages of the implementation of cultural genocide before and during the full-scale invasion of the Russian Federation in Ukraine and illustrates conceptual links between the cultural destruction and physical/biological destruction of the Ukrainian nation.</p> <p>The acts of cultural genocide, committed by the Russian Federation in Ukraine, are seen as systematic steps to destroy the national culture and identity of the Ukrainian people. These acts have preceded and have been accompanying the acts of physical and biological destruction during the full-scale invasion in 2022. The mechanisms for the destruction of culture and identity of Ukrainians as a national group include: the appropriation or destruction of cultural heritage and historical memory, the targeted persecution of pro-Ukrainian activists, the imposition of Russia’s education system in temporarily occupied territories and the segregation of residents of the occupied territories from Ukraine’s information space. The author argues that it is necessary to take into account acts of cultural genocide for further qualification of crimes committed by the Russian Federation in Ukraine as genocide and bring it to justice for the crime of genocide by international and national law. To facilitate these processes, there is a need for further establishment of the recognition of crimes of cultural genocide in the system of international law.</p> Vladyslava Bakalchuk Copyright (c) 2022-11-15 2022-11-15 72 79 10.53679/2616-9460.specialissue.2022.07 MULTILATERAL SUPPORT VIA INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS TO STRENGTHEN THE ECONOMY OF UKRAINE IN ITS KINETIC RESISTANCE TO RUSSIA’S AGGRESSION <p><strong>This article</strong> analyzes the foreign aid obligations and multilateral support commitments to Ukraine by the G7 countries and the EU in term of securing financial, military and humanitarian aid in the kinetic resistance to Russia’s aggression. The focus is on the instruments of financial support that are used to supply Ukraine with military equipment as well as the EU's support mechanisms for Ukraine, in particular those used by the European Peace Fund, EU macro-financial aid programs, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the European Investment Bank, among others. The author reports on her monitoring of assistance to Ukraine by international organizations through IMF programs within the framework of the Rapid Financing Instrument, the World Bank's emergency aid package, donor funds of the Solidarity Fund as well as financial support for refugees. Then the author highlights specific features of the large-scale restrictive economic, financial and budgetary measures targeting Russia in the defense, food and energy sectors, which Ukraine’s partners have already implemented, and offers recommendations for the further implementation of interconnected and systemic solutions. Further steps include a number of economic measures that can be applied because of the kinetic war of the Russian Federation against Ukraine. They ought to be coupled with an expanded toolkit for multilateral assistance to Ukrainian sectors and enterprises that suffered because of the large-scale military invasion of the Russian Federation in Ukraine. In conclusion, the author indicates essential features, key elements and points out the main directions of multilateral support of international organizations in strengthening the economy of Ukraine.</p> Danyila Oliinyk Copyright (c) 2022-11-15 2022-11-15 80 93 10.53679/2616-9460.specialissue.2022.08 THE ISSUES IN THE COLLECTION, VERIFICATION AND ACTIONABILITY OF CITIZEN-DERIVED AND CROWDSOURCED INTELLIGENCE DURING THE RUSSIAN INVASION OF UKRAINE, 2022 <p><strong>When</strong> <strong>Russia</strong> invaded Ukraine on 24&nbsp;February 2022, a war was opened on four&nbsp;fronts simultaneously, in the North, the East, the Southwest and the South. With Ukrainian troops immediately committed to battle along multiple axes of Russian advances, the importance of accurate and actionable Intelligence was key from the start. Alongside the usual military and civilian elements of the Ukrainian Intelligence community were Ukrainian citizens desperate to contribute what they were seeing and hearing on the ground as the invasion unfolded. Tools were rapidly made available for citizens to report sightings of Russian military activity, which were then verified and processed by Ukrainian Intelligence and where possible, were turned into actionable end-product reporting for military targeting. Such citizen-derived or crowdsourced Intelligence has provided an additional strand of source reporting for Ukraine during the conflict, yet its collection and use is not without its issues. Ethical issues are created, such as citizens putting themselves in ever-greater danger to collect information which they believe may be useful. This creates an&nbsp;additional problem of the potential attribution by the aggressor, of such a&nbsp;citizen as an&nbsp;informant, along with the concomitant risks which that brings. Policy needs to&nbsp;sufficiently incorporate citizen Intelligence to allow actions to be taken based on this product, especially lethal strikes. Practical issues include an increased volume of raw material for human analysts to process, before actionable Intelligence can be produced. This paper addresses these issues and signposts additional issues that require further research.</p> Paul Burke Copyright (c) 2022-11-15 2022-11-15 94 103 10.53679/2616-9460.specialissue.2022.09 IMPORTANCE OF MAINTAINING AND STRENGTHENING NATO’S NUCLEAR DETERRENCE BASED ON THE RUSSIAN AGGRESSION AGAINST UKRAINE <p><strong>The study</strong> focuses on NATO’s nuclear policy in the face of Russia’s aggressive policy and threats from the Kremlin.</p> <p>The author examines the history of the nuclear policy of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization since the founding of NATO, as well as key aspects of the implementation of NATO’s nuclear deterrence policy.</p> <p>Part of the study focuses on the geostrategic aspects of NATO’s nuclear triad and covers the three components of the nuclear triad: strategic bombers, intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). It also examines specific aspects of the use of nuclear systems by the three main nuclear powers of NATO, namely the USA, the UK, and France, and the main geopolitical rivals of the Alliance, specifically the Russian Federation, taking into account Russian aggression against Ukraine, and the People’s Republic of China.&nbsp;</p> Nika Chitadze Copyright (c) 2022-11-15 2022-11-15 104 110 10.53679/2616-9460.specialissue.2022.10