CONTENTS AND MAIN PROSPECTS OF RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH PROPAGANDA IN THE CONTEXT OF THE HYBRID WAR BETWEEN RUSSIA AND UKRAINE

  • P. Konovalchuk
Keywords: hybrid war, informational influence, “russkiy mir”, propaganda, Russian Оrthodox Сhurch

Abstract

In the article analyzed the peculiarities of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) the propaganda as one of the most effective instruments of conducting the hybrid war between Russia and Ukraine. The conditions of church and state relations in realization of the imperial internal and foreign policy of the Russian authority are highlighted. Substantiation of the ideological content of the foreign policy of the Russian Federation (RF) in the context of religious activity is presented. The analysis of the essence of the ROC propaganda methods on the informational space of Ukraine during the hybrid war was carried out due to the popularization of the ideas of “russkiy mir”. The methods to which Russian political power resorts for interaction and control of religious propaganda at the foreign state is singled out. The efficiency of using pseudofactors of religious identity, unity and continuity of historical development of Russians and Ukrainians in advancing ideas of the concept of “russkiy mir” is substantiated. The directions, tasks and content of the ideological, political and religious influence of the Russian Orthodox Church on the public consciousness of the Ukrainian population are revealed. The Kremlin's ideologists' paradigm of long-term information-propaganda policy in leveling the statehood of the Ukrainian people is illustrated. The basic ways of conducting the ROC of informational and propagandistic activity on the territory of Ukraine are highlighted. The purposeful activity of intensifying interreligious controversy in Ukraine through the destructive criticism of Christian confession which support the patriotic and European integration aspirations of Ukrainians by the ROC has been shown. The ROCs attempt to avoid public discussion of the Crimean capture and the active participation of Russian mercenaries and special forces in sabotage actions in the East of Ukraine is indicated. The assessment of the threats of propaganda of the Russian Orthodox Church in cooperation with the UOC-MP in the manipulation of public consciousness and the spread of separatist sentiment is given.

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Published
2019-03-28
How to Cite
Konovalchuk, P. (2019). CONTENTS AND MAIN PROSPECTS OF RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH PROPAGANDA IN THE CONTEXT OF THE HYBRID WAR BETWEEN RUSSIA AND UKRAINE. Strategic Panorama, (2), 31-36. Retrieved from https://niss-panorama.com/index.php/journal/article/view/80
Section
Countering Russian Aggression