THE ISSUES IN THE COLLECTION, VERIFICATION AND ACTIONABILITY OF CITIZEN-DERIVED AND CROWDSOURCED INTELLIGENCE DURING THE RUSSIAN INVASION OF UKRAINE, 2022
Abstract
When Russia invaded Ukraine on 24 February 2022, a war was opened on four fronts simultaneously, in the North, the East, the Southwest and the South. With Ukrainian troops immediately committed to battle along multiple axes of Russian advances, the importance of accurate and actionable Intelligence was key from the start. Alongside the usual military and civilian elements of the Ukrainian Intelligence community were Ukrainian citizens desperate to contribute what they were seeing and hearing on the ground as the invasion unfolded. Tools were rapidly made available for citizens to report sightings of Russian military activity, which were then verified and processed by Ukrainian Intelligence and where possible, were turned into actionable end-product reporting for military targeting. Such citizen-derived or crowdsourced Intelligence has provided an additional strand of source reporting for Ukraine during the conflict, yet its collection and use is not without its issues. Ethical issues are created, such as citizens putting themselves in ever-greater danger to collect information which they believe may be useful. This creates an additional problem of the potential attribution by the aggressor, of such a citizen as an informant, along with the concomitant risks which that brings. Policy needs to sufficiently incorporate citizen Intelligence to allow actions to be taken based on this product, especially lethal strikes. Practical issues include an increased volume of raw material for human analysts to process, before actionable Intelligence can be produced. This paper addresses these issues and signposts additional issues that require further research.
References
Aroged. (2022, March 10). The Ministry of Digital Affairs launches the “єVorog” chatbot. Aroged. https://cutt.ly/uXg8EDG
Augusteijn, N. (2022, April 15). Railway sabotage after 50 days of war in Ukraine: here is what we know. Railtech.Com. https://cutt.ly/8Xg1zSL
Ball, T. (2022, April 04). Belarus defectors cripple Russian supply lines. The Times. https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/belarus-defectors-cripple-russian-supply-lines-t5qvrq2g9
BBC. (2022, July 04). How many Ukrainians have fled their homes and where have they gone? BBC News. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-60555472
Bergengruen, V. (2022, April 18). How Ukraine is crowdsourcing digital evidence of war crimes. Time. https://time.com/6166781/ukraine-crowdsourcing-war-crimes/
Blinken, A. J. (2022, June 01). $700 million drawdown of new U.S. military assistance for Ukraine. U.S. Department of State. https://www.state.gov/700-million-drawdown-of-new-u-s-military-assistance-for-ukraine/
Burgen, S. (2022, February 28). Ukrainian sailor arrested for trying to sink oligarch’s superyacht. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/feb/28/ukrainian-sailor-arrested-for-trying-to-sink-oligarchs-superyacht
Burke, P., Elnakhala, D., & Miller, S. (Eds.) (2021). Global jihadist terrorism: Terrorist groups, zones of armed conflict and national counter-terrorism strategies. Edward Elgar. https://doi.org/10.4337/9781800371309
Burke, P., Miller, S., & Regan, M. C. (Eds.) (2022). Ethical issues in collecting and using citizen-derived intelligence: Towards a framework of ethical and practical guidelines derived from the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
Bussoletti, F. (2022, April 20). Russia has a new enemy in Ukraine: E-Enemy. Difesa & Sicurezza. https://www.difesaesicurezza.com/en/defence-and-security/russia-has-a-new-enemy-in-ukraine-e-enemy/
Datta, A. (2022, March 04). HawkEye 360 detects GPS jamming along Ukraine border prior to Russian invasion. GeoSpatial World. https://www.geospatialworld.net/blogs/hawkeye-360-detects-gps-jamming-along-ukraine-border-prior-to-russian-invasion/
Defense Express. (2022, April 22). SpaceX shut down a Russian electromagnetic warfare attack in Ukraine last month against Starlink. Defense Express. https://cutt.ly/oXg0usI
Department of the Army Headquarters. (2007, October 10). Soldier surveillance and reconnaissance: Fundamentals of tactical information collection. [FM 2-91.6]. Washington, DC, 90 p. https://irp.fas.org/doddir/army/fm2-91-6.pdf
Druziuk, Ya. (2022, April 18). Ukrainian citizens are using a bot to help spot Russian troops. INSIDER. https://www.businessinsider.com/ukraine-military-e-enemy-telegram-app-2022-4?r=US&IR=T
Erwin, S. (2022, March 08). U.S. general: Starlink in Ukraine showing what megaconstellations can do. SpaceNews. https://spacenews.com/u-s-general-starlink-in-ukraine-showing-us-what-megaconstellations-can-do/
Formeller, C. (2020, November 12). Introducing 15 cm HD: The highest clarity from commercial satellite imagery. Maxar Technologies. https://blog.maxar.com/earth-intelligence/2020/introducing-15-cm-hd-the-highest-clarity-from-commercial-satellite-imagery
Gant, S. E. (2007). We’re all journalists now: The transformation of the press and reshaping of the law in the Internet age. Free Press.
Halpert, M. (2022, May 04). Russia’s invasion has cost Ukraine up to $600 billion, study suggests. Forbes. https://www.forbes.com/sites/madelinehalpert/2022/05/04/russias-invasion-has-cost-ukraine-up-to-600-billion-study-suggests/?sh=3df1515b2dda
Herhkovitz, S. (2020). Crowdsourced Intelligence (Crosint): Using crowds for national security. The International Journal of Intelligence, Security, and Public Affairs, 22(1), 42–55. https://doi.org/10.1080/23800992.2020.1744824
Kadam, T. (2022, May 19). ‘Super show’ in Ukraine – British Brimstone missiles get major export order after busting Russian tanks. The Eurasian Times. https://eurasiantimes.com/british-brimstone-missiles-get-major-export-order-ukraine/
Kostenko, A. (2022, March 24). Smartphones, crowdsourcing play crucial role in defence of Ukraine. CARAVANSERAI. https://central.asia-news.com/en_GB/articles/cnmi_ca/features/2022/03/24/feature-03
Lerman, R. (2022, February 25). On Google Maps, tracking the invasion of Ukraine. Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2022/02/25/google-maps-ukraine-invasion/
Lewis, J. [@Dr. Jeffrey Lewis]. (2022, February 25). According @googlemaps, there is a ‘traffic jam’ at 3:15 in the morning on the road from Belgorod, Russia to the Ukrainian border. It starts *exactly* where we saw a Russian formation of armor and IFV/APCs show up yesterday. Someone’s on the move [Tweet]. Twitter. https://twitter.com/armscontrolwonk/status/1496657816740036616
Mack, E. (2021, January 24). SpaceX launches a record 100-plus satellites on a Falcon 9 rocket. CNET. https://www.cnet.com/science/spacex-launches-a-record-100-plus-satellites-on-a-falcon-9-rocket/
Miller, C., Scott, M., & Bender, B. (2022, June 08). UkraineX: How Elon Musk’s space satellites changed the war on the ground. Politico. https://www.politico.eu/article/elon-musk-ukraine-starlink/
Miller, S. (2006). Collective moral responsibility: An individualist account. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 30(1), 176–193. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4975.2006.00134.x
Miller, S. (2008). Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism. In Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: Ethics and Liberal Democracy. Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Miller, S. (2014). The ethics of targeted killing: Osama bin Laden, drones, and counter-terrorism. Public Affairs Quarterly, 28(4), 317–340.
Miller, S. (2016). Shooting to kill: The ethics of police and military use of lethal force. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190626136.001.0001
Miller, S., & Makela, P. (2005). The collectivist approach to collective moral responsibility. Metaphilosophy, 36(5), 634–651. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9973.2005.00397.x
Miller, S., Regan, M., & Walsh, P. F. (Eds.). (2022). National Security Intelligence and Ethics. Routledge.
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCRH). (2022, June 10). Ukraine: civilian casualty update, 10 June 2022. OHCHR. https://www.ohchr.org/en/news/2022/06/ukraine-civilian-casualty-update-10-june-2022
Partington, R. J. (2022, May 03). Russia’s war in Ukraine ‘causing £3.6bn of building damage a week’. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/may/03/russias-war-in-ukraine-causing-36bn-of-building-damage-a-week
Regan, M. C. (2008). Moral intuitions and organizational culture. In Georgetown Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper (Vol. 941). Georgetown Law.
Regan, M. C. (2013). Nested ethics: A tale of two cultures. Georgetown University.
Rosenblum, M. (2017, December 06). Today we are all journalists. HuffPost. https://www.huffpost.com/entry/today-we-are-all-journalist_b_6778860
Roth, J., & Ruesch, A. (2022, April 28). Russia-Ukraine war puts spotlight on amateur Swiss OSINT analyst. Neue Zuercher Zeitung. https://www.nzz.ch/english/russia-ukraine-war-puts-spotlight-on-amateur-swiss-osint-analyst-ld.1681445
Security Service of Ukraine [@ServiceSsu]. (2022, March 08). Ваші повідомлення про пересування ворога через офіційний чат-бот ➡ https://t.co/qM3l39liUp щодня приносять нові трофеї. Цього разу ми отримали координати ворожої техніки з позначками «V» на Київщині. Результат – на фото: полум’яні «привіти» окупантам [Vashi povidomlennia pro peresuvannia voroha cherez ofitsiinyi chat-bot ➡ https://t.co/qM3l39liUp shchodnia prynosiat novi trofei. Tsoho razu my otrymaly koordynaty vorozhoi tekhniky z poznachkamy «V» na Kyivshchyni. Rezultat – na foto: polumiani «pryvity» okupantam]. [Tweet]. Twitter. https://twitter.com/ServiceSsu/status/1501148565263036416 [in Ukrainian].
Servaes, J. (2009). We are all journalists now! Journalism, 10(3), 371–374. https://doi.org/10.1177/1464884909102600
Stottlemyre, S. A. (2015). HUMINT, OSINT, or something new? Defining Crowdsourced Intelligence. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 28(3), 578–589. https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2015.992760
UK Ministry of Defence. (2021). Integrated Operating Concept 2025. HMSO.
UK Ministry of Defence [@DefenceHQ]. (2022, May 15). Latest Defence Intelligence update on the situation in Ukraine – 15 May 2022 [Tweet]. Twitter. https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/status/1525704460214878208
U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services. (2022, March 8). Senate hearing to receive testimony on United States Strategic Command and United States Space Command in review of the Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2023 and the Future Years Defense Program. U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services. http://surl.li/coyfk
Vasilyeva, N. (2022, March 31). The Belarus ‘railway rebels’, who dare stop Vladimir Putin’s invasion in its tracks. The Telegraph. https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2022/03/31/belarus-railway-rebels-dare-stop-vladimir-putins-invasion-tracks/
Walker, J., Bernstein, L., & Lang, S. (2003). Seize the high ground: The U.S. Army in space and missile defence. U.S. Army Center of Military History. https://history.army.mil/html/books/070/70-88-1/cmhPub_70-88-1.pdf
Walt, V. (2022, May 31). Elon Musk’s fledgling Starlink satellite network has become a lifeline in Ukraine. Fortune. https://fortune.com/2022/05/31/spacex-starlink-satellite-ukraine-invasion/
Werner, D. (2021, October 08). NGA plans annual survey of international Earth imagery leaders. SpaceNews. https://spacenews.com/nga-annual-olymmpics/
Yan Huang, M., Hunt, B., & Mosher, D. (2021, March 04). What Elon Musk’s 42,000 Starlink satellites could do for – and to – planet Earth. INSIDER. https://www.businessinsider.com/how-elon-musk-42000-starlink-satellites-earth-effects-stars-2020-10?r=US&IR=T
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
ISSN 
ISSN 
