Keywords: Transnistrian settlement, peacekeeping role of Ukraine, ‘5 2’ mechanism, Russian factor, US and EU strategies, Russian aggression against Ukraine, deoccupation strategy for the temporarily occupied territories of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions.


The article addresses the role of Ukraine in the Transnistrian settlement. The author analyses its peacekeeping experience and plans for further steps in the light of Ukraine's national interests in the context of Russia's ongoing aggression. Other countries’ roles as participants in the peace process are also considered.

This conflict should not be classified as an interethnic or interfaith one, just as the Russia-Ukraine conflict, it is a geopolitical confrontation with a minor ethnic component. The positions of the parties do not differ fundamentally on ethnic or confessional grounds, but consist in worldview differences, geopolitical orientation of elites and the population of the two banks of the Dniester.

Russia, which had been a de facto participant in the hot phase of the conflict, managed to take over the role of the mediator. Ukraine and Moldova agreed on the legal personality of the Transnistrian occupation authorities. Countries where separatist conflicts have been provoked by external forces cannot agree to negotiate directly with the occupation administrations of the ‘separatist’ areas. They should negotiate directly with the independent players who have provoked, provided this conflict and are able to make  decisions.

It is important to conduct an effective awareness-rising campaign in Transnistria and the temporarily occupied territories of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, create highly professional alternative media and a high-quality information product. Russia's continued military presence in Transnistria is becoming an additional security threat to Ukraine and the Black Sea region.

The ‘peacekeeping’ mechanism needs to be reformatted and internationalized by withdrawing the Russian contingent and deploying the International Civilian Observer Mission. Such operations should be carried out either with the participation of contingents of exclusively neutral countries, or with multinational contingents if possible, which will guarantee their impartiality. Findings of the present study may be used as the groundwork for formulating Ukraine’s strategy of countering the Russian aggression and retrieving the temporarily occupied territories of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions.


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